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FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION OF WRONGFUL DEATH PROCEEDS
Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. v. United States
465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972)
Pursuant to a Connecticut statute,' the executor of decedents' estate
commenced a wrongful death action, but a monetary settlement was
reached before trial. The executor did not include the proceeds of
the settlement in decedents' gross estate when filing the estate tax re-
turn. The Commissioner, relying upon section 2033,1 assessed a defi-
1. Although the decedents were killed in Virginia, the court held that Connecticut
law controlled because New York, where the wrongful death action was commenced,
applies the law of the state that has the strongest interest in the resolution of the case.
Since the decedents were domiciled in Connecticut at the time of their death, Connecti-
cut's concern with the administration of the estates was the strongest state interest in-
volved. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 997 (D. Conn.
1971). CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-555 (Supp. 1969) states:
In any action surviving to or brought by an executor or administrator for
injuries resulting in death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or
administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuriesjust damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital
and nursing services, and including funeral expenses, provided no action
shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two
years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no
such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act
or omission complained of.
Recoveries under the Connecticut wrongful death statute are distributed "as per-
sonal estate in accordance with the last will and testament of the deceased if there is
one or, if not, in accordance with the law concerning the distribution of intestate per-
sonal estate .... ." CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-280 (Supp. 1969).
2. The Commissioner also attempted to tax the proceeds under § 2041 (power of
appointment), but the court of appeals summarily rejected the argument, because,
among other reasons, "property subject to a § 2041 power of appointment must be
in existence prior to the time of the decedent's death." Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 465 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1972).
Death benefits may be includible under sections of the Code other than § 2033.
Death benefits may come in various forms: as an insurance plan, see, e.g., Estate
of Clew v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Estate of
Keller, 113 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1940); Anthracite Trust Co. v. Phillips, 49 F.2d 910
(M.D. Pa. 1931); as an employer program, see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2)
(1972); or as statutory provisions such as workmen's compensation, see, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 26, § 253 et seq. (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq. (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.010 et seq. (1969); and social security,
see 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). The Estate Tax Code has been specifically ex-
panded to include some of these items within the gross estate of the decedent. See,
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ciency. After payment, a refund suit was initiated in the district court,
which held that the settlement was taxable.8 The court of appeals re-
versed and held: The pre-trial settlement proceeds of a wrongful death
action are not includible in the decedents' gross estate under section
2033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
Section 2033 includes in decedent's estate all interests in property
held at the time of decedent's death.; "Property" includes realty,0
chattels,7 goodwill,' stocks, 9 and choses in action,10 including tort and
e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (employer death benefit plans); INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2049 (insurance plans).
3. The decision below is reported as Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 977 (D. Conn. 1971).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of death.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a), T.D. 6684, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 411 states in part:
The gross estate of a decedent who was a citizen or resident of the United
States at the time of his death includes under section 2033 the value of all
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever situated
beneficially owned by the decedent at the time of his death ....
For a discussion of amendments to § 202(a) of the original 1916 Act, see H.R. REP.
No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46
(1950); H.R. REP. No. 1385 (Conf.), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1950) (discussions of
the exception for real estate situated outside the United States). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946), for a discussion of the elimination of the restrictive
clause that appeared after "at the time of his death" which read, "which after his
death is subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of
its administration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate."
5. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
6. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2033(1), T.D. 6684, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 411: "The
gross estate of a decedent. . .includes under section 2033 the value of all property,
whether real or personal . . . ." The holder of title to realty is considered the owner
of the land, even if it is mortgaged. Estate of Henry Adams Ashforth, 30 B.T.A. 1306
(1934). See also 2 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 14.11
(Supp, 1959) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
7. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2033(1), T.D. 6684, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 411. All house-
hold and personal effects of a decedent are includible in the gross estate. Estate
of Leonard S. Waldman, 46 B.T.A. 291 (1942). See also C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs § 4.7 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES
& KRAMER]; 2 MERTENS § 14.10.
8. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1958), which lists good will as a factor to be
considered in valuing an interest in a business. See also 2 MERTENS § 14.30.
9. See, e.g., Crocker v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1935). See also
LowNDEs & KRAMER § 4.7; 2 MERTENS § 14.15.
10. Examples of choses in action in which the decedent was held to have a prop-
erty right under § 2033 or its predecessor include: Commissioner v. Wrag, 141 F.2d
638 (1st Cir. 1944) (right of reimbursement against a primary obligor); Millard v.
Maloney, 121 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1941) (claims arising out of a will controversy);
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contract actions. 1 Property, therefore, encompasses both survival and
wrongful death actions. 2 Survival statutes provide that causes of ac-
tion for personal injury arising prior to death survive the decedent, and
may be enlarged to include damages for death itself.3 The theory be-
hind wrongful death recovery under a survival statute is to compensate
the estate for the loss of decedent's future earnings due to decedent's
death. 14  Wrongful death statutes compensate certain statutorily des-
ignated beneficiaries for the loss of future support and create a new
cause of action after the decedent has died.15 Some statutes combine
the elements of both wrongful death and survival statutes. Although
Estate of Jones, 1961 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 617 (right to commission); Estate of Eleanor
Hughes Beggs, 13 T.C. 131 (1949) (claims arising out of loans); Estate of Elizabeth
Harper, 11 T.C. 717 (1948) (notes, secured and unsecured); Estate of Leonard B.
McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (1940) (right to a bonus); Estate of G. Percy McGlue,
41 B.T.A. 1199 (1940) (right to a commission); Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 10 B.T.A. 43 (1928) (contract claim for money). In all cases such claims
must be enforceable, see Rev. Rul. 57-54, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 298, and not so specu-
lative that they have no value, see, e.g., Estate of Isabella N. Skinker, 13 B.T.A. 846
(1928); Estate of Joseph Nemerov, 1956 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 64. See also LowNDEs &
KRAMER § 4.7; 2 MERTENS § 14.18.
11. Contract actions are treated as property and are included in decedent's gross
estate. Estate of Rainger v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1950); Farmers
Bank & Trust Co., 10 B.T.A. 43 (1928). See also 2 MERTENS § 14.18.
For tort actions treated as property under § 2033 and its predecessor, see Rev. Rul.
69-8, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 219; Estate of Frederick Rodiek, 33 B.T.A. 1020 (1936)
(tort treated as property, but only includible if actual or potential). Cf. United States
v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936) (tort action is property for
income tax purposes only if the cause of action is actually existing); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 417 (D. Mass. 1936) (claim for refund of income
tax).
12. At common law, no new right of action arose by way of the decedent's
wrongful death. Survival and wrongful death statutes were adopted to mitigate the
harshness of this rule. See F. HARPER & F. JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1285-88,
1329-33 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 898-914 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 1:1-1:6 (1966) [herein-
after cited as SPEISER]; Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for
Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TL. L. REv. 386 (1942). The first
wrongful death act was Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
13. The survival statutes that enlarge into wrongful death actions upon death in-
elude IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (1950); LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1971);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (Supp. 1971).
14. See PROSSER 905; SPEISER § 3:2. One statute that does not follow this general
approach is N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (Supp. 1971), which provides the action
shall be brought for the benefit of decedent's dependents.
15. See generally SPEISER §§ 1:8-1:20; Oppenheim, supra note 12, at 386; Rose,
Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 545 (1935).
For the text of all federal and state wrongful death statutes, see SPEISER at Appendix A.
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these statutes provide only for the recovery of death benefits, not for
pain and suffering in a non-instantaneous death situation, they never-
theless incorporate the survival theory that the action is one the de-
cedent possessed.'"
In determining whether a decedent has a taxable interest' 7 in wrong-
ful death benefits, revenue rulings concerning analogous death bene-
fits have established three criteria. 18 The primary criterion is whether
the decedent had control over the designation of the beneficiaries. The
other two criteria are whether the decedent had a property interest in
the funds and whether he had control over the amount paid. The
rationale behind these three criteria seems to be that decedent lacks
the requisite nexus to the benefit proceeds to be considered the owner
of the proceeds.' 9
As applied to wrongful death recovery, these criteria do not clearly
determine whether the decedent has a taxable property interest in the
16. The wrongful death statutes that are written as survival actions are CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1956).
17. An "interest" as used in § 2033 connotes an interest by property law rather
than a concept created by the tax laws. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
316 U.S. 56 (1942). Thus the determination of what is taxable interest is strongly
influenced by state law. See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER §§ 4.15-4.18.
18. Rev. Rul. 67-277, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 322 (recovery granted by the Federal
Survivor's Insurance Benefit Law, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970), not includible
under § 2033); Rev. Rul. 60-70, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 372 (recovery granted by the
Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 228e (1970), not includible).
19. The revenue rulings, see note 18 supra, state that such personal direction,
which is defined largely by the ability to control the proceeds, was lacking and there-
fore no "interest" existed. Although the ability to designate the beneficiaries is the
primary criterion, the other criteria are taken into account in conjunction with the
"designation" standard. See note 20 infra.
An analogous situation to these lump sum payments exists in employee death bene-
fits. If the decedent lacks power to designate the recipients of the death benefits
and there was no exchange of consideration, the benefits will not be taxed. See, e.g.,
Glenn v. Hanner, 212 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1954); Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
383 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950); Estate of
Eugene F. Saxton, 12 T.C. 569 (1949). See also LowNDEs & KRAMER § 4.2; Note,
The Generic Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits Beyond the Ambit of Section
2039, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 585, 589.
However, if decedent designates the beneficiary, the benefit payment will be taxed.
See, e.g., Sample v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1782 (W.D. Pa. 1961);
Altshuler v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Kemochan v. United
States, 29 F. Supp. 860 (Ct. Cl. 1939); Estate of Adeline F. Davis, 27 T.C. 378
(1956); Estate of Raphael A. Casilear, 1945 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1084; Estate of Wil-
liam J. O'Shea, 47 B.T.A. 646 (1942); Estate of Stuart Wilson, 42 B.T.A. 1196
(1940); G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 160, modifying G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1
CuM. BULL. 281, revoked by Rev. Rul. 97, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 380.
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proceeds under section 2033. The first criterion of a property inter-
est in an established benefit fund may be viewed in two possible ways
as applied to wrongful death: that the criterion is irrelevant because
there is no pre-existing fund in which a person may have an interest;
or that the lack of a fund indicates that the decedent had no interest in
any possible recovery. The criterion regarding control indicates that
wrongful death statutes, unlike other statutory death benefits, may give
the decedent some "control," since some wrongful death statutes pro-
vide that a sum recovered may pass through his will."° Therefore it
may be argued that since the decedent can "control" who recovers and
how much is recovered, he therefore has a property interest.
Applying the same three criteria to employee death benefits, the IRS
has ruled that when no right to compensation is "vested in the em-
ployee," he has no "interest." 21  The rationale is that if the employee
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-280 (Supp. 1969) states that damages for wrong-
ful death "shall be distributed as personal estate in accordance with the last will and
testament of the deceased .... ." IowA CODE ANN. § 635.9 (1950) states that dam-
ages recovered for wrongful death "shall be disposed of as personal property belonging
to the estate of the deceased ....
Many employee death benefit cases lay primary emphasis on the ability of the
decedent to designate the beneficiaries in determining if the decedent had an interest in
the benefits. See, e.g., Estate of Garber v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959);
Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957). But see Second Nat. Bank v.
Dallman, 209 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1954). Garber and Granger would seem to indicate
that the ability to designate the beneficiary is sufficient without more to determine
that the decedent had an interest in the benefits. However, the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), held that an unexercised
power of appointment which in effect controlled the designation of the beneficiaries
was not includible within the decedent's gross estate. This result would seemingly
contradict these holdings in the employee death benefits cases.
21. Rev. Rul. 56-637, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 600.
For employee death benefits, that interest is determined by the degree of control
that the decedent had over the designation of the recipients of the death benefits and
by the degree of certainty that the property would vest in the recipient upon the em-
ployee's death. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION
RECOMMENDATIONS 63 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALl RECOMMENDATIONS]; LOWNDEs
& KRAMER § 4.2; Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959
DUKE L.J. 341; McDowell, Estate and Income Tax Aspects of Employee Death Benefits
Including Corporate Payments to Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 985 (1967); Polisher & Kerr, Employer Death Benefit Payments, 57 N.J. ST. B.J.
60 (1971); Note, The Generic Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits Beyond the
Ambit of Section 2039, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 585.
Employee death benefits were often taxed under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 3,
§ 811(a), 53 Stat. 120 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033). Even now such bene-
fits may be taxable under § 2033. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 469,
472 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A 314, A 316 (1954), for a
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does not have a right to the funds, then his interest is a "mere expec-
tancy. '22  In wrongful death actions recovery is contingent upon the
commission of a tort and an award of damages. Since such potential
recovery is not "vested, 23 it represents an expectancy in which the
decedent has no property interest.24
Several revenue rulings which directly deal with the "interest" ques-
tion establish that settlement proceeds recovered under wrongful death
acts are not includible in the gross estate.25 The rulings state that, "In
his lifetime, decedent never had an interest in the action or the proc-
eeds," and therefore, "nothing passed" from the decedent to his bene-
ficiaries.2 6  The meaning of this statement is unclear. It may mean
discussion of the relationship between § 2039 and § 2033. See also ALl RECOMMENDA-
TION at 67; Covey, Estate, Gift and Income Taxation: 1970 Developments: Employ-
ment Benefits, 5 INST. ON EsT. PLANNING § 71.112 (1971); McDowell, supra at 985;
Note, Employee Death Benefits, 26 TAx L. REv. 329-30 (1971); 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
619-20 (1963).
22. If the employment benefits are revocable or modifiable by the employer or if
the employer's obligation to pay is not absolute, the benefits will not be taxed because
they are not considered a property interest, but an "expectancy." See, e.g., Worthen v.
United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961); Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
383 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1956);
Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp.
56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); Kramer v. United States, 406 F2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate
of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951); Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950);
Estate of Eugene F. Saxton, 12 T.C. 569 (1949); Estate of Emil L. Stake, 11 T.C.
817 (1948). See also LOWNDES & KRAMER § 4.2; Beck, Family Benefits and Family
Security. Employee Death Benefit Payments, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 471,
490-94 (1955); Kramer, supra note 21, at 348-50; Polisher & Kerr, supra note 21, at
11-14. Cf. Estate of John Morrow, 19 T.C. 1068 (1953).
23. It might be argued, in desperation, that every wrongful death recovery is
vested, if one is willing to assume that the possibility of such a right of action has
been granted to the citizens of the state upon passage of the wrongful death act.
24. But see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 219 (recovery for wrongful death
created by the Death on the High Seas Act not taxable because the Act created a new
cause of action brought on behalf of statutorily designated beneficiaries); Rev. Rul.
68-88, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 397 (recovery for wrongful death created by the Virginia
wrongful death act not taxable); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 179 (cause of
action created by the New Jersey wrongful death act not taxable because the act
created a new cause of action in the administrator, acting for the benefit of those en-
titled to recover under the state's intestate statute).
26. In Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 219, for example, the service ruled that:
This right of action arose with the decedent's death by virtue of the statute,
which also governs the distribution of the proceeds. The decedent in his life-
time never had an interest in either the right of action or the proceeds.
Therefore, with respect to damages recoverable under the Act, nothing passed
from the decedent to the beneficiaries which would be includible in his gross
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that: (1) a decedent can not have an interest in recovery under any
type of wrongful death statute; (2) a decedent could not have an inter-
est under the specific statutes involved in each ruling, namely, those
not based on a survival theory;2 7 or (3) although the decedent can have
an interest in wrongful death actions, it is not an interest he can hold
in his lifetime. If the first is correct, these rulings conflict with the
federal estate tax doctrine that property interests should be determined
according to state law.2" More specifically, the rulings would conflict
with survival-type wrongful death statutes 29 under which the decedent
might be deemed to possess a property interest.30  If the second inter-
pretation is correct, these rulings are not conclusive as to a decedent's
interest in actions brought under survival statutes or survival-type
wrongful death statutes, because the theory of these statutes is that the
decedent originally possessed the cause of action. 31  If the third inter-
pretation is correct, however, the crucial language becomes "in his life-
time."
Normally, the interpretation of the temporal requirement "at the
time of his death" has involved the valuation of pre-existing interests
3 1
estate for Federal estate tax purposes. .. ."
The statement was originally made in Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 179, and
thereafter cited in Rev. Rul. 68-88, 1968-1 Cums. BuLL. 397 and Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1
CUM. BULL. 219.
27. See note 15 supra.
28. The principle that state law is determinitive in ascertaining the quantum and
quality of a decedent's property interest for estate tax purpose is well established. See
eog., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Magruder v. Supplee, 316
U.S. 394 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Doll v. Commissioner,
149 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945); Brown v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1941);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a). See generally LowNnEs & KRA~m §§ 4.15-4.18.
However, this principle is based on the federal estate tax point of view. From the
state's point of view, it is doubtful that the state passes wrongful death statutes with
the federal estate tax consequences in mind.
29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (Supp. 1969).
30. See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Kling v. Torello,
87 Conn. 301, 87 A. 987 (1913), which interpret the predecessor of CONN. GEN. STAT.
REV. § 52-555 (Supp. 1969) as meaning that the decedent possessed the cause of
action.
3 1. See notes 13, 16 supra.
32. E.g., The regulations rule that "included" property is income that has accrued
at the decedent's death, while "excluded" property includes income accruing after the
decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d) (1971).
In such a valuation case, a court held that "at the time of death" meant "after the
time of death," because that is when contingencies in transferring the benefits stop
operating. See Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957), in which em-
451
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:445
or complete divestment of an interest before death,"3 rather than a
determination of when a legal interest begins. The principal case deals
with this last-named issue.
The Connecticut wrongful death act operates on the survival theory
of wrongful death. 4 The key issue in Connecticut Bank is whether
the decedent held the property 5 interest s6 "at the time of his death."
Stressing the time of death language, the government argued that the
cause of action arose simultaneously with death, thereby vesting a prop-
erty interest in the decedent. 7 The court rejected this argument on the
basis of "simple logic,""s citing a recent Connecticut Supreme Court
ployee "contingent benefits" were valued from just after death, at which time they first
possessed a value.
33. Compare Sizer v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 450 (1928), and Henry F. Jaeger,
33 B.T.A. 989, aff'd, 88 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1935), holding that there was not a
complete divestment of property before death, with United States v. Union Trust Co.,
90 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1937), and Estate of J. Fred Lohman, 1947 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
925, holding that there was complete divestment before death. See generally LOWNDES
& KRAmER § 4.12.
34. See notes 1, 16 supra.
35. The action for wrongful death was accepted as "property" by the court of ap-
peals. See notes 5-16 supra.
36. The court of appeals apparently accepted the lower court finding that this
action was a "legal interest." For a discussion of "interest," see notes 17-31 supra.
The lower court, 330 F. Supp. at 1001, made the conclusion "that the plaintiff's
decedents thus held a property interest disposable by Will which must be included in
their respective gross estates." (Emphasis added.) The court of appeals, 465 F.2d
at 762, stated that "the district court . . . held that the wrongful death recoveries, and
therefore the legal interests which the Commissioner sought to tax . . . were ascer-
tained and determined under Connecticut law, a conclusion, the correctness of which,
is not questioned on these appeals. . . ." (Emphasis added.) This statement may have
meant that the determination of the district court that the decedents held a property
interest was correct, or merely that the choice of laws decision at the district court
level was correct.
Both of these federal courts are subject to the state court's interpretation of who
has a property interest in wrongful death actions. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456 (1967). See note 28 supra. The Connecticut law is unclear on this
point. Compare Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); and Kling v.
Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 A. 987 (1913), which indicate the decedent owns the prop-
erty interest in wrongful death actions, with Harris v. Barone, 147 Conn. 233, 158
A.2d 855 (1960); State v. Cambria, 137 Conn. 604, 80 A.2d 516 (1951); State v,
Cosenzo, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 484, 236 A.2d 107 (1967), which state that the adminis-
trator brings the action, but holds the proceeds as a trustee for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. In any event, Connecticut law gives the decedent the ability to designate
the beneficiaries through his will, pursuant to CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 45-280 (Supp.
1969). This indicates the decedent had an "interest." See note 20 supra.
37. 465 F.2d at 763.
38. Id. "Simple logic mandates the conclusion that an action for wrongful death
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decision"" which stated that a cause of action for wrongful death does
not arise until after the decedent is dead. 40  Since section 2033 requires
that property be owned at the time of death, the court's decision is
technically in accord with the statutory language.41
Extending the court's logic, recoveries for instantaneous wrongful
death would never be includible because the cause of action for surv-
ival or wrongful death would not arise until after the time of death. 2
cannot exist until a decedent has died, at which point, he is no longer a person capable
of owning any property interests." The court also held that "where, as here, there
was no property interest in the decedent which passed by virtue of his death, but
rather one which arose after his death, such an interest is not property owned at
death and not part of the gross estate under § 2033."
39. The court relies on Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 360 n.2, 216 A.2d
638, 641 n.2 (1966):
Death or its direct consequences could not survive as recoverable elements of
damage except by virtue of the wrongful death statute, General Statutes
§ 52-555. . . . Our survival statute (§ 52-599) does prevent an action or
right of action from being lost, under the common-law rule, by the death of
the possessor. . . . But no person, during his lifetime, can possess an action
or right of action embracing, as elements of damage, his own death or any
of its direct consequences ....
40. The statement in note 38 supra would seem to apply to all wrongful death
statutes, whether based on survival theory or whether the statute creates a new cause
of action. The statement is sound as to the latter type of wrongful death action,
see note 15 supra, but seems at least theoretically inconsistent as applied to survival-
based actions. Both survival statutes that are enlarged to include damages for death,
see note 13 supra, and wrongful death statutes written as survival actions, see note 16
supra. proceed on the theory that the decedent possessed the right of action before
he died.
41. But see Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957), which held em-
ployee death benefits were to be valued at a moment just after death. The argument
that the moment just after death is crucial applies by analogy to wrongful death re-
coveries using the same "at the time of death" statutory language. It is more difficult
to predict the non-includability of noninstantaneous wrongful death actions because
under survival statutes that are enlarged to include wrongful death actions, the damages
are consolidated in one cause of action, which clearly arose before the death occurred
(at least as far as antemortem pain and suffering is concerned). Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-8,
1969-1 Cums. BULL. 219, in which the damages for pain and suffering were held in-
cludible in decedent's gross estate, but because the wrongful death statute under
which the action for death was brought created a new cause of action, the recoveries
for death were held not includible in decedent's gross estate.
42. If the argument made by the government had been accepted, the impact on
future includability of wrongful death proceeds would be far different. If the cause
of action for wrongful death arises simultaneously with the instance of death, the ques-
tion of "'at the time of death" would be answered in the affirmative, and the only
question would be the ownership of the cause of action. Thus, under survival statutes
the proceeds would probably be includible in the decedent's gross estate because the
theory of such statutes is to compensate the estate. See note 14 supra. This statement
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A uniform rule of exclusion regardless of the outcome of a strained in-
terest-based analysis is desirable.43 It is illogical that recovery for the
same type of tort should depend on the slightly different language of the
various wrongful death statutes.
is complicated by another factor in finding a decedents "interest," control. See note
20 supra.
As applied to wrongful death statutes that create a new cause of action, the proceeds
would not be includible because the theory of these statutes is to compensate the
survivors. See note 15 supra. Thus, the survivors own the property interest.
43. Uniformity would be difficult using an interest-based analysis, since the IRS
has decided that recoveries under non-survival wrongful death statutes are not in-
cludible. See note 25 supra.
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